Introduction
After almost three decades of widespread devolution of taxing and spending powers to regional and local governments, the late 2000s saw a reversion in the fiscal decentralization process both in the developed and in the developing world (Maleski et al. 2014) . As far as Europe is concerned, most countries restricted the fiscal autonomy of local governments by introducing tax and expenditure limits (TELs) (IEB 2013) .
This paper aims at investigating the consequences of the imposition of tax limits on voter turnout and on the outcomes of Italian local elections. It exploits the unique institutional features of the Italian system of tax limits, particularly their time-series and cross-municipality variation, and uses voter turnout in parallel parliamentary elections as the counterfactual.
Somewhat surprisingly, relatively little attention has been devoted to the analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization/centralization on voter turnout in regional and local elections (Blais et al. 2011) . Percival et al. (2007) find that turnout is higher in US states that spend more on valued public programs (education, health) and impose heavier tax burdens. Henderson and McEwen (2010) study voter participation in regional elections across a number of OECD countries, and conclude that regions that gained power have recorded higher levels of voter turnout. Finally, Andersen et al. (2014) show that voter turnout tends to be higher in Norwegian localities where the stakes of elections (tax revenues from hydropower generation resources) are higher, and Michelsen et al. (2014) find that decentralization of local public good provision boosts voter turnout in German municipalities.
Indeed, the conventional rational voting framework (Dhillon and Peralta 2002; Feddersen 2004) suggests that fiscal decentralization should foster party competition and voter turnout in local elections.
On the other hand, its impact on the mechanism of candidate selection is less obvious. Consider the most general model of voluntary, costly voting, wherein ideologically biased voters (say, conservative versus progressive) receive informative signals about candidates' commonly valued competence (Ghosal and Lockwood 2009; Krishna and Morgan 2011; Bernhardt et al. 2011; Aldashev 2015) .
Within that model, any mechanism narrowing the positional issue gap between candidates (as a constitutional limit on their tax rates in the spirit of Brennan and Buchanan 1980) makes it more likely that voting occurs according to competence signals than to own ideological views. The switch to competence voting tends to lower voter turnout owing to the perception of smaller electoral stakes.
However, such a switch also improves the selection property of local elections by favoring the convergence of votes to the most valent candidate, irrespective of their ideologies.
The above reasoning is reminiscent of Stokes's (1963) argument -more recently formalized by Groseclose (2001) -that deemphasizing position issues (i.e., choosing a policy from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preferences is defined) amplifies the importance of candidates' valences, and is in line with the idea that a decline in voters' ideological attachment and polarization leads to more cost-efficient policies (Svensson 2005) , smaller equilibrium political rents (Banerjee and Pande 2007; Casey 2015; Aldashev 2015) , better performance in the provision of local public services (Geys et al. 2010) , and the creation of a growth-promoting environment (Besley et al. 2010) .
I analyze the impact of the Italian system of tax limits on voter turnout and candidate competition in the elections held during the past decade in more than 7,000 Italian municipalities. By exploiting a tax limit change having a heterogeneous impact on local authorities, I employ a difference-in-differences research design to find that tax limits provoke a moderate reduction in voter turnout and candidate competition, some improvement in candidate valence proxies, and a sizeable rise in elected mayors' win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that, by lessening the ideological stakes of local elections, tax limits favor voters' party-line crossing and convergence of votes to the most valent candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional setup and the evolution of local tax limitation rules over the 2001-2010 decade in Italy. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis, and section 4 concludes.
The Italian local government structure

Municipal elections
Elections in Italian municipalities take place every five years, with direct election of the mayor in a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size, with larger localities (>15,000 inhabitants) having a runoff stage among the top two candidates if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the first stage. Voters cast a vote for a mayoral candidate as well as for a councillor candidate if they wish. 1 1 Two-thirds of the council seats are assigned to the councillor candidates (frequently grouped in one or more parties) supporting the mayor who is elected.
Voting is formally mandatory for all citizens aged 18 or higher, though no sanctions exist for abstainers. Importantly for the purposes of our empirical analysis, the election schedule across the country is staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each of the 2001-2010 years, as shown in Table 1. < Table 1 > Turnout at municipal elections averages almost 80%, though it has been steadily declining over time, a secular tendency that is common to virtually all developed countries (Wattenberg 2002) . Turnout variation across Italian municipalities is substantial, ranging from 'frictional abstention' in a number of smaller localities to below 50% in some small to medium sized towns. On the other hand, turnout rates never drop below 60% in larger cities (Revelli 2013 ).
The municipal level of government is decidedly fragmented, with average population size of around 7,000 inhabitants. The number of cities exceeding 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them exceeding one million residents, with more than half of the localities having fewer than 3,000 residents.
2 This means that in most municipalities a single vote can make a difference for the mayoral candidate who is elected. 3 Moreover, the likelihood that a vote will be decisive for the selection of candidates into the local councils -whose number varies depending on population size, from 12 councillors (<3,000 inhabitants) to 60 (>1,000,000 inhabitants) -is even higher. In smaller communities, a handful of votes frequently can be enough to gain a seat in the council.
Tax limits
Italian municipalities' own revenues consist mainly of a local property tax and a surcharge on the national personal income tax. The latter was introduced in 1999 as part of a wider process of fiscal decentralization that started in 1993. 4 The municipal income tax surcharge has since represented an important source of revenue for municipal governments, amounting to around one-fourth of total own municipal tax revenues in the late 2000s. Since the tax base is computed according to a comprehensive net ability to pay principle that includes income from all types of labor (employees, pensioners, selfemployed, and non-incorporated business) and from real and financial assets, the tax is owed by the vast majority of residents. Moreover, the purely proportional features of the municipal surcharge (a flat rate on a tax base identical to the national personal income tax), with no low income exemptions, make it visible and salient to all personal income taxpayers, including those -say, part-time workers, small business owners and pensioners -who are burdened only lightly by the national personal income tax.
The municipal income surcharge is subject to the nationwide rate limits reported in Table 1 .
Interestingly, and crucially for our identification strategy, those limits changed on a nearly annual basis during the subsequent decade, and affected localities in heterogeneous ways. In particular,
Phase 1 (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) : at the time of the introduction of the municipal surcharge and for the next three years, a nationwide rate limit was set at 0.5% of the income tax base, and annual municipal rate increases could not exceed 0.2%. This implies that a municipality consistently setting the maximum rates would hit the limit of 0.5% in 2001.
Phase 2 (2003) (2004) : in an attempt to slow down local tax and spending growth, the central government froze all local surcharge rates at their existing (2002) levels for the subsequent two years.
Phase 3 (2005) (2006) : following the protests of the authorities that were stuck at a zero tax rate and were facing growing financial troubles because of grant retrenchment, the central government established that municipal surcharge rates would remain at their 2002 levels in localities with a strictly positive surcharge rate, while the authorities stuck with a zero surcharge during the past had the freeze lifted. While this constituted a substantial relief for the latter authorities, the feeling grew in the remaining municipalities that local tax policy was virtually commanded by central government. This was accompanied by a rising number of nonpartisan mayoral candidates even in the largest cities, some of whom were even endorsed by major nonprofit organizations for the protection of consumers' rights, arguing that ideological voting in local elections had been swept away by fiscal centralization.
Phase 4 (2007-2008) : following the 2006 general elections and change of government, the tax freeze unchanged (0.4% and 0.7%, respectively, on the cadastral value of property -i.e., the periodically assessed rental value of property that is recorded in the municipal register).
was removed and the upper rate limit was raised to 0.8%.
Phase 5 The voter turnout rate is defined as the ratio of votes cast to eligible voters. Being bound by definition between 0 and 100%, I report estimates based on a linear specification (1) as well as on a log-of-the-odds transformation in equation (2):
Here, fm1 (fm2) absorbs all time-invariant local traits affecting turnout (e.g., social and civic capital endowment), yt1 (yt2) controls for common influences on all elections taking place in a given year, and emt1 (emt2) captures unobserved time-varying influences on turnout in locality m; the parameters picking the effect of tax limits are βTL1 and βTL2.
The panel dataset is unbalanced both in the sense that some municipalities record more than two elections during the decade (because, for instance, of the mayor's resignation during the term of office) and because elections occur at different points in time (Table 1 ). The municipality-specific terms are treated as fixed and equations (1) and (2) The estimation results of equations (1) and (2) Table   2 . Columns (2.1) and (2.3) rely on specifications that include only the tax freeze dummy (TLmt) and municipality and year fixed effects for the linear and the log-of-the-odds transformation respectively.
Columns (2.2) and (2.4) allow for other determinants of turnout.
< Table 2 > The results from the linear and log-of-the-odds tranformation are similar. As expected, the number of candidates has a positive and significant effect on turnout (p-value less than 0.01), while the size of population, the ex post win margin and the presence of a concomitant regional election are estimated to have little or no impact on voter participation. As for the key tax freeze dummy, it is estimated to have a significant negative effect on voter turnout. In terms of magnitude of the impact, the linear speficication returns an estimate of -0.53, meaning that the tax freeze dampens turnout significantly, but by less than one percentage point. On the other hand, the marginal effects of the regressors on turnout vary with the level of the dependent variable in the log-of-the-odds transformation. In particualr, the effect of the tax limit is less than 0.5 percentage points of turnout when turnout exceeds 90%, and rises to almost 1.3 percentage points at 50% turnout.
The 2006 treatment
It might be argued that, owing a universal tax freeze in a number of years, the effect of tax limits could in 2006, while 339 were not so affected. The turnout difference-in-differences between the two samples can be straightforwardly computed as:
where Δturnout = turnout2006 -turnout2001. Table 3 The decline is more pronounced in the treated group. The turnout difference-in-differences equals -1.3
percentage points, and is statistically significant. It is slightly larger than the estimated effect from the log-of-the odds specification around the median 2006 turnout rate (75%). Moreover, the effect of tax limits is virtually unaffected when controlling for the change in population size, number of candidates, election closeness and turnout at parliamentary elections.
Tax limits and political competition
As argued above, fiscal limitations can be expected to lessen political competition and restrain potential candidates from running for office by reducing the policy space and the expected benefits Table 5 : the number of candidates falls in the treated group and increases in the control group.
< Table 5 > Tax limits have a significant negative effect on the degree of competition for office, though of relatively small magnitude (a 5% decline in the number of mayoral candidates in the treated relative to the control group). Table 5 also shows that the lesser competition for office in the tax-limited sample relative to the control sample is not driven by changes in population size between the two elections.
Tax limits and valence
Finally, we turn to the investigation of whether tax limits have an impact on the quality of elected mayors. The fundamental intuition is that the move from private value (ideological) voting to common value (valence) voting that tends to be favored by the imposition of tax limits facilitates rational voters' party-line crossing and convergence towards high valence candidates.
Recent research proxies candidates' valences by their level of education (Galasso and Nannicini 2011), professional record (Bordignon et al. 2012) , or labor market performance in terms of the Mincer residual from an earnings regression on individual level observables (Besley et al. 2012) . Table 6 reports summary information on a number of mayors' sociodemographic characteristics in the 2001 and 2006 elections in the treatment and control groups.
< Table 6 >
In particular, Table 6 shows the share of elected mayors reporting positive scores on the following binary indicators of valence: young (age at appointment < 50), female, educated (holding a university degree or more), expert (having a specialization in management, administration, or law), and distinguished professional status (architects, engineers, physicians, accountants, lawyers, and academics). Table 6 shows that only the latter score exhibits a significant difference between the two groups in the 2006 elections.
The DiD estimates on the above indicators of valence are reported in Table 7 .
< Table 7 On the other hand, given the difficulty of defining and measuring candidate valence objectively and accurately, Table 8 Table 9 reports the results of a number of checks of the robustness of the above evidence. Table 3 suggests that the treated authorities differ from the control ones on a number of dimensions, I perform a propensity score matching approach (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . In particular, I first estimate the probability that a municipality is selected into the treated group conditional on the initial municipal characteristics reported in Table 3 (the propensity score). Next, I compute DiD estimates using the logit-estimated propensity scores to assign kernel weights to the control observations (Heckman et al. 1998 ). for being accountable to the DSP rules, smaller localities being exempt from the spending restrictions.
Robustness analysis
The expenditure limitation scheme is presumed to be binding if an authority is statutorily required to comply with it (population > 3,000), capturing the idea that budgeting limits per se affect the popularly perceived ideological stakes in local elections, irrespective of whether the rather involved -and somewhat hard to decipher -limitations in force actually bind. Based on the joint operation of the tax 13 Recent research has used panel data on Italian municipalities to investigate the effects of the DSP on a number of local policies, including compliance with the DSP rules, size of budget deficits, and spending composition and growth (Balduzzi and Grembi 2011; Bordignon et al. 2011; Grembi et al. 2012) . < Table 9 > The results of the foregoing checks are reported in Table 9 . In general, the effects of the tax freeze on turnout rates, numbers of mayor candidates and win margins persist, or are reinforced, in all of those instances. When allowing for spending and taxing limitations at once as in the lower row of Table 9 , the estimated effects are even larger than when considering tax limitations alone.
Finally, and as far as exogeneity of the tax limitation criteria that I have exploited above is concerned, it might be argued that selection of authorities into the tax freeze sample in 2006 cannot be treated as strictly exogenous given that it is determined by the income tax rates that were deliberately set by municipal governments before freezing was introduced. Authorities setting positive surcharge rates in the early years of application of the municipal income tax surcharge (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) 
